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ABSTRACT.  During  the  1950s,  a  decade of socio-economic  turbulence  in  the  arctic  area of Canada, the  Eskimo  Affairs  Committee  played  a  significant 
role in shaping  a  new  set of policy initiatives that  Ottawa  was  framing  toward  Eskimos.  In  bringing  together  representatives of the  major  arctic  field 
organizations, both  public  and private, the  committee  served  as  a  corporatist  device  for  overcoming  the  limitations of a  colonial  and  underdeveloped state. 
The  members  gained  a  formal  avenue of consultation,  and  a  limited  power of veto, over  the new policy  initiatives  being  framed by the  Department of 
Northern  Affairs.  The  northern  administration  gained  a  source of intelligence  from  several  well-established  arctic organizations, at  a  time  when  the 
department’s  own  field  presence  was still embryonic.  The  committee  considered  a  variety of issues,  including  the  commercial  relations of Eskimo 
trapping,  the case for a  new  field  administration,  proposals for expanded  credit  channels  and  measures  to  extend  the  scope of  wage employment  and  small 
manufacturing.  Ultimately it was  the  need for  more  conventional  channels of popular  representation,  along  with  the  enlarged capacities of the  northern 
administration,  that  led  to  the  committee’s  demise.  Nevertheless,  the  record of  the committee’s  activities  offers  an  unusual  reflection  of  a  development 
administration  in  the  making. 
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&SUME. Au cours des anndes  cinquante, qui furent  une  ddcade  d’agitation  socio-dconomique dans  la partie  arctique  du Canada, le  comitk des affaires 
esquimaudes  a  joud n r6le pdponddrant dans  I’dlaboration de  nouvelles  politiques  qu’Ottawa  destinait  aux  Esquimaux. En regroupant des reprdsentants 
des grands  organismes B la  fois  publics et privds  oeuvrant  dans 1’ Arctique,  le  comitd  servait  de  mdcanisme  corporatif pour surmonter les limitations  d’un 
dtat  colonis6  et  sous-ddvelopp6. Ses membres  gagnkrent  une  voie Mgale pour se faire entendre et un pouvoir  de  vdto  limit6 surles  nouvelles  politiques  que 
le ministkre du  Nord  canadien  dtait en rain de cder. L’administrationnordique gagna une source  d’information  constitude pardiverses organisations  bien 
dtablies dans la dgion arctique, B un  moment ob la pdsence m6me  du  ministkre dans  la dgion n’en  dtait encore qu’i M a t  embryonnaire. Le comitk 
examina des questions  d’ordres divers, comprenant  les  relations  commerciales  de  la  trappe  esquimaude, l  pertinence  d’une  administr?tion locale, des 
propositions pour faciliter le crddit et des mesures  visant B accroitre le champ des emplois  salaries et de  la fabrication B petite  dchelle.  A  la fin, ce fut le 
besoin d’obtenir des voies  de repdsentation populaire  plus  conventionnelles, joint B des capacitds  accmes  de  I’administration  du  grand Nord, qui 
menkrent B la  disparition du comitd. I1 n’en  reste  pas  moins  que  le  registre des activitks  du  comitd offre un reflet  inhabituel  d’une  administration da s son 
processus  de dation. 
Mots  clds:  administration,  politique  kconomique,  affaires  esquimaudes  du  Canada,  politique 
Traduit pour le journal par  Ndsida  Loyer. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the North, as elsewhere, studies of state institutions are an 
integral part of the analysis of social change. Several  works  have 
begun  the task of charting the institutional and  organizational 
contours of the northern state (Flanagan, 1958; Woodley, 1965; 
Government of the Northwest Territories, 1978). Often, how- 
ever, a focus on the big picture, and the largest organizational 
units, proves limiting. The magnitude of the  documentary  task 
results in many  such studies being  exhaustively  descriptive  but 
disappointingly short on analysis. Another  potential  pitfall of 
administrative histories, whatever their focus, is that  they may 
isolate the organizational dynamics - the  inner  workings of 
structures where state personnel claim centre stage - from  the 
wider set of social and political forces in which all formal 
agencies are immersed.  Not surprisingly, then,  some of the  most 
insightful studies of state units  in the North  have  come  where  a 
concrete structure can  be  contextually situated, such as arctic 
gas pipeline planning (Dosman, 1975), the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (Morrison, 1985), the  land  use  planning  system 
(Usher  and Beakhust, 1973) or the Geological  Survey of Canada 
(Zaslow, 1975). Another  rewarding  approach  begins  not  with an 
agency but with an issue and clientele, such as Dene treaty 
negotiations (Fumoleau, 1975) or Eskimo administration 
(Jenness, 1964). 
This article will examine one rather modest  component of the 
northern state, which operated in the critical decade of the 
1950s. This was the period  in  which  the  national  government 
identified the northern territories as an object of policy  meriting 
systematic attention. With  the  deepening of Cold  War tensions, 
the region assumed greater strategic and  defence  significance. 
This brought  renewed concern for the  confirmation of Canadian 
sovereignty. At the same time, social forces  within  the  North 
generated changes that also called for a state response. The 
economic pressures within the native hunting and trapping 
economy inflicted considerable hardship on the majority of 
residents. Still, the industrial interests of southern  Canada  were 
advancing on the North  in  a  way  that  obliged  the state to assume 
new regulatory and promotional roles. Yet, as it responded, 
Ottawa faced a complicated field of administrative jurisdictions, 
ecologies and social structures scattered  across  the  largest  land 
mass  in the nation. 
For  ten years, 1952-62, the  Eskimo  Affairs  Committee  (EAC) 
served as a special mechanism  to  deal  with  some  major  public 
policy issues affecting the  barrenlands of the  Northwest  Territo- 
ries (N.W.T.). During this time the economic future of the 
Eskimo people was subject to extensive review. The “tradi- 
tional” wildlife harvesting economy  was judged to be  in decline, 
and new structures were sought to replace it. In addition, 
elements of the post-war  welfare state were  belatedly  reaching 
the northland, provoking an extended debate on their prospec- 
tive impact. Throughout this time  the state faced  the  task of 
establishing an administrative field  presence  sufficient for its 
new responsibilities. It was  thus questions of state intervention 
in economic structure, as well as social, educational  and  health 
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services, that  dominated the northern  policy  agenda  during  this 
decade. The Eskimo Affairs Committee contributed to this 
process in several respects. At a time when formal channels 
between Ottawa and indigenous arctic interests  were  virtually 
non-existent, the committee provided  a link. In  differing  degrees 
it offered a forum for representation (albeit circumscribed), 
coordination, consultation and legitimation. 
Certainly the  northern state had  not  lacked for coordinative 
anddecision-makingmechanisms. Withinthe bureaucracy, inter- 
departmental bodies  have  long operated at senior and intermedi- 
ate levels. Prior to 195 1, the Northwest Territories Council, by 
virtue  of its membership, functioned as a senior coordinating 
committee. From 1948, the Advisory  Committee  on  Northern 
Development (ACND) widened the range of bureaucratic 
players, even if it failed to match the working calibre of the 
council. At intermediate levels, a  number of committees  han- 
dled  more specialized issues. For example, the  Advisory  Board 
on Wildlife Protection, created  in 1916, advised  the  council and 
the federal cabinet on  policy  and legislative changes for half  a 
century. 
When it came to representation, however, the  strongly  colo- 
nial character of  post-war  northern  politics  was  illustrated  in the
lack of avenues for popular  input  and control. For the N.W.T., 
electoral politics only began  in  a  most  rudimentary  form after 
the Second World War. Even here, the single federal constitu- 
ency and four Temtorial Council seats were confined to the 
Mackenzie District south of  the tree line. It  was  not  until  1966 
that  any Territorial representatives could  be  chosen by Eskimos 
from the Arctic. In part because of this, the legitimacy of 
northern  policy  has often been problematic. While  consultation 
with Euro-Canadian organizations was no substitute for the 
process of popular representation, it offered  a way to lessell  the 
resistance by  the  organized  interests  that  preceded  the  northern 
administration into the field. This concern  with  organizational 
as opposed to popular legitimation is an  apt  reflection of the 
administrative colonialism then  prevalent in  the North. 
PARAMETERS OF ESKIMO ADMINISTRATION 
In law and  in administration, the status of the  Eskimo  people 
changed continually through  the  early  twentieth century. Ini- 
tially Ottawa acknowledged jurisdiction over temtorial Eski- 
mos alone. While  very little was  known of conditions  among 
these people, formal responsibility for them was  assigned first to 
the  Department  of Indian Affairs and  in  1927  transferred to the 
Department  of Interior. Then a lingering dispute between  Ottawa 
and the Province of Quebec (over the financial obligation for 
Eskimo relief in arctic Quebec) led the  Supreme  Court to rule in 
1939 that all Canadian  Eskimos  were  a federal responsibility 
under  the Indian Act. Once again  this  opened the question  of 
how Eskimo affairs should be administered. Both the Indian 
Affairs Branch (IAB) and  the  Northern  Administration offices 
were candidates for the job. 
After World  War 11, the prospect of recombining  the  Eskimo 
and Indian programs  under  the  IAB  was  considered.  For its part, 
the Northern Administration  argued forcefully that ‘ ‘there  should 
be a uniform policy for all Eskimos in regard to education, 
welfare  and  economic  problems  accompanied by an integrated 
development of  the  whole Eskimo group” (PAC 221253~). In 
1950 this responsibility was  awarded to the  Northern  Adminis- 
tration Branch. The choice of a  new  administrative apparatus, 
unencumbered by a century of precedents in Indian  administra- 
P. CLANCY 
tion, was to have significant consequences  for future policy. It 
encouraged  a focus on specifically arctic conditions. The  desig- 
nated centre for this new mandate was the Department of 
Resources  and  Development (DRD), which  was  renamed  the 
Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources 
(DNANR)  in 1953. Particularly  important  here  was the Arctic 
Services Section, which  held  responsibility  for  the  barrenlands. 
Initially this  consisted of a  small  headquarters  unit  with no field 
staff. Officers travelled  north  with  the  annual  supply  boats or 
relied on the  RCMP detachments for advice and support. Over 
the decade discussed here, the  arctic  administration  evolved  into 
a separate field service that, while  not  exhaustive of the  northern 
state, emerged as its lead element in dealing  with  Eskimo affairs. 
While  northern  matters in general  drew  greater  attention in 
Ottawa after 1945, several factors highlighted conditions among 
the Eskimos. The fur market  slid into decline in the late 1940s, 
bringing severe pressure to bear  on  native hunter-trappers. At 
the same time, the new post-war social transfer programs of 
family allowances and  old age pensions  were  extended to the 
North, injecting new  cash  streams  into  the  native  economy  but 
also raising fears about the corrosive effects of the  welfare  state 
on a “simple” society. Beyond this, reports  circulated of distress 
and starvation among certain Eskimo groups. These arose 
mainly  in  the isolated Keewatin interior, a  combined  result of 
the closure of local trading posts  and of a failure in subsistence 
game supply. 
Together these pressures triggered  a  policy  review  in  the late 
1940s. James Cantley, a former Hudson’s Bay Company  arctic 
trader, was engaged to assess the condition of the trapping 
economy. While he demonstrated the marked variation that 
prevailed across the region, Cantley  showed  the  general effects 
of depressed fur prices. The commodity  needs of Eskimos had 
to be met either through trapping returns or through social 
assistance transfers. The essential  point  was  that  the fur trade 
provided  a declining proportion of Eskimo total  income  relative 
to transfers. Cantley  warned  that he “relief economy” had the 
potential to undermine life on  the land, drawing  Eskimos  into 
permanent residence at the  posts  to  subsist on whatever  rations 
their social assistance would permit. He  clearly  demonstrated 
that no response to the fur market  could be framed  indepen- 
dently  of the welfare issue. As  a solution, Cantley  proposed  a 
close working relationship between  Ottawa and the  Hudson’s 
Bay  Company (HBC). Under  Ottawa’s  policy supervision, the 
Company could manage each native’s  trading  account to control 
his level of credit so as to avoid the accumulation of excessive 
credits or debts. Either in concert or in addition to social 
transfers, the fur price level could be stabilized  in  periods of 
falling markets, in order to reinforce the  Eskimos’  commitment 
to hunting  and  trapping as a  commercially  productive  activity 
(Cantley, 1950). 
With Cantley’s report circulating internally, an alternative 
scheme was advanced in 1951 by the RCMP Commissioner 
L.H. Nicholson. Wary of relying on the Hudson’s  Bay  Company 
as the core economic institution, he  proposed  instead  a  crown 
company to hold  a  trading monopoly. This  concept had  been 
advanced periodically in northern  administrative  circles  since 
the 1920s, and it was  clearly  less  popular  in  the  Department of
Resources  and  Development  (which  was close to  the  HBC)  than 
was Cantley’s scheme. The department  decided to hold  a  meet- 
ing to consider this  and other matters.  Rather  than  restricting 
attendance to government agencies alone, the  deputy minister, 
Hugh  A. Young, also invited  the  Hudson’s  Bay  Company and 
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the  Anglican  and  Roman  Catholic churches, who controlled  the 
largest (albeit “private”) field  organizations in the  Arctic.  Thus 
was  born the Conference on  Eskimo Affairs. 
ORIGINS OF THE ESKIMO AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
The initial conference agenda was  extremely ambitious, under- 
scoring the range  of questions at stake  in  the  northern field. It 
began  by considering Cantley’s analysis  of  the “new” Eskimo 
economy  and  the cumulative effects of  government  interven- 
tions. From here  a  number of responses  were  set out, ranging 
from the crown trading company, the creation of “Eskimo 
agents” in the field and price support for furs to Cantley’s 
proposal for managing the trade in consort with the HBC. 
Finally, moving  beyond  the  trapping field, a  number of alterna- 
tive questions were  posed  regarding  Eskimo education, employ- 
ment practices, housing, health  and  wildlife  harvesting. 
Not surprisingly, the May 1952 conference drew a strong 
attendance: 55 people, from ten federal agencies, the two 
churches and  the  Hudson’s  Bay  Company.  After  several days’ 
discussion, a concluding press release was issued suggesting 
that  a cautious understanding  had  been reached. The participants 
were careful not to censure the  policies  then in place, but  they 
did a f f m  the need to push forward: “present measures for the 
care and advancement of Eskimos were sound, but efforts 
should be unified and intensified wherever possible” (PAC 
22/253a). But, at the same time, there was little consensus on the 
advisability of new economic initiatives. Thus for the time 
being, the Eskimos were to be encouraged to remain  on  the  land 
and follow their traditional ways. It was felt, however, that  the 
school curriculum could be “improved.” From these cautious 
observations, a clutch of new policy initiatives would later 
spring. 
At the initiative of senior officials in the Department of 
Resources and Development, a continuing consultative body 
was  born.  Its  members  were  drawn from the upper  echelons of 
the organizations, both public and private, most  active in the 
North. The Eskimo Affairs Committee, as it came to be known, 
was chaired by the deputy minister of  Resources and Develop- 
ment (later Northern Affairs and  National  Resources). It included 
the RCMP commissioner, the director of the Indian Health 
Service (Department of  National  Health and Welfare) and the 
head  of the Arctic Section (DRD). Additional  members  were the 
Anglican  Bishop  of the Arctic  (Rev.  D.B. Marsh), the Roman 
Catholic Bishop  of the Arctic  (Rev. J.  Trocellier)  and  the Fur 
Trade Manager for the Hudson’s Bay Company (R.H. 
Chesshire). 
Given the breadth  and  complexity of the  conference topics, 
the choice of  a continuing committee was  understandable. It 
would take years to frame an appropriate response to such 
matters. The conference had admitted candidly that on the 
economic issues “NO definite conclusions  were  reached  on  what 
could be done” (PAC 22/253b). In creating some follow-up 
machinery, the agencies  most  keenly  affected  by the agenda 
topics were invited to participate. With the mandate for both 
Eskimos  and the territorial administration  in general, the Depart- 
ment  of Resources and  Development  was  the  sponsoring  agency. 
Since the future of the fur economy  loomed large in any strategy, 
the HBC  and the RCMP held central roles. Both  emergency  and 
preventative health care hinged on action by the Indian  (later 
Northern) Health Service. Given that the latter had  yet to operate 
on the barrens, the church mission stations and  the  police  acted 
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as the first level of medical aid, with  the former even  operating 
several small hospitals. The missions also served, along  with  the 
police, as sub-agents for issuing welfare  and  other social trans- 
fers. In this capacity they  authorized the credits on  which  the 
Eskimos  drew at the Hudson’s  Bay posts. Finally, since  educa- 
tion was viewed as a crucial lever for social adaptation, the 
churches were again front and centre. It was  not  yet clear just 
how  the arctic school system  would evolve. While  the  Arctic 
Section had placed its first six “welfare-teachers” into  the field, 
the churches furnished the core of  the  instructional  manpower 
and facilities in the Mackenzie District. They  firmly  intended to 
extend their reach into the Arctic  and  would  not  be  displaced 
easily. In fact, a sub-committee on education was established at 
the outset to address just this question. Its  membership  mirrored 
the composition of the main committee. Chaired by James 
Wright (Head, Arctic Section, DRD), it includedFather  Laviolette 
(O.M.I.), Reverend H.G. Cook (Ang.), the  Superintendent of 
Education (DRD) and a representative of the Indian Affairs 
Branch. 
As the core committee, the  Eskimo  Affairs  Committee  (EAC) 
met  twice yearly, in  May  and October. This schedule  brought 
the members together at the beginning  and at the close of  the 
northern travel season, facilitating regular reports on field 
conditions. Each meeting  began  with  briefings and policy  pro- 
posals from the northern administration, then carried on to 
solicit members’  views  on  the soundness, timing  and fit of  the 
various items. One participant  remarked  retrospectively  that  ‘‘to 
a considerable extent, the agendas  have  consisted of reports by 
the Department, which other agencies have then discussed” 
(PAC 22/335a). Agendas were circulated in advance, minutes 
were  recorded  and the deputy minister kept the  ACND  informed 
of  the  new initiatives vetted by the  Eskimo  Affairs Committee. 
Indeed, Hugh  Young  explained  the role of the  EAC  in  Eskimo 
policy formulation: 
As a long term policy, emphasis was being placed on the 
provision of adequate  education but in the  meantime  there  were 
many short-term problems. He had set up a Committee on 
Eskimo Affairs . . . which had made valuable proposals for the 
solution of some  of  these  problems. [PAC 22/254.] 
In fact, the EAC may  have  played  a  more ext nsive, and  more 
subtle, role than this implied. To begin with, the flow of 
information was decidedly two  way. It was  often difficult to say 
who  was the consultant and  who  the consultee. Ottawa  was still 
desperately short of accurate information  on field conditions in 
the Arctic. At the same time, the federal officials in the  Northern 
Administration Branch already held some definite ideas for 
future programs. What  they  needed was, first, the  broad  concur- 
rence  of committee members and, secondly, the support  of  the 
non-governmental  agencies  in the implementation of certain  key 
measures.  Both functions took  on  a particular importance  given 
that their shared clientele, the Eskimo people, were  not  politi- 
cally organized beyond the camp level and  could  not be effec- 
tively consulted during the preparatory work. At one point, 
consideration was given to establishing local committees  in  the 
North, whose membership would parallel, so far as circum- 
stances allowed, the main Eskimo Affairs Committee. In the  end 
it was  decided that “the time is not  yet  opportune to set up local 
committees” (PAC  22/253d). Not until 1959 did  any  Eskimos 
participate in the meetings. Then Officials of the Northern 
Affairs Branch invited four Eskimos to attend  the  committee’s 
tenth meeting. Residents of Rankin Inlet, Fort Chimo and 
Aklavik, these Eskimos all held  wage-earning jobs in  the  settle- 
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ments. While  the department explained  their  selection “on the 
grounds of intelligence, assertiveness, and ability to express 
themselves clearly,” certain  committee  members  lamented  the 
absence  of at least one hunter-trapper  (PAC  22/335b).  In  any 
event, no one claimed  that these delegates  were  in  any sense 
representative. Nor could the Northwest Territories Council 
make this claim on its own behalf.  While  it  was  constitutionally 
entitled to legislate for the entire territory, the councillors 
focused their attention on matters affecting the Mackenzie 
District. Despite the absence of substantive Eskimo input, a 
committee consensus on specific policy  measures  could  serve to 
legitimize some very dramatic plans for social change, while  the 
fact of prior consultation could  reduce  the  prospects for institu- 
tional resistance in  the field. In short, the  committee  offered  a 
useful device in the formative stages of Ottawa’s  developmental 
efforts on the barrens. 
THE COMMITTEE IN ACTION 
Just how these subtle and complex patterns of influence 
unfolded  is  best illustrated with concrete examples.  With  the 
education  question  hived  off on its own, the  main  committee 
devoted most of its time to “improvements to the Eskimo 
economy. ” At the committee’s inaugural  meeting  in  the  autumn 
of 1952, the administration presented  several  complementary 
initiatives for consideration. It was clear that the committee 
would  not accept either the Hudson’s  Bay  Company or a  crown 
trading  company as the fulcrum for economic  policy.  Nor  was 
there  a consensus on the advisability  of social transfers per se. 
The administration had  always  been  sensitive to the disruption 
such  programs could bring. When family allowances  and  old 
age pensions were first introduced to the Arctic, the  N. W .T. 
Council prepared special rules for their distribution, aimed 
principally at ensuring that the new purchasing power was 
expended on useful  producer  and  consumer  goods. 
However, this did not prevent continuing controversy. At 
least one committee member  harboured  strong  views on this 
question. In 1953 Bishop  Marsh set out his  views on the  impact 
ofsocialtransfers. Lamenting“thesocializationoftheEskimo,” 
he  argued  that “govemrnent doles are ruining  the  morale  and 
undermining  the  health  of  the Eskimo” (Time, 1953).  During 
the  winter  of 1952-53, this issue attracted  a  brief  and  exagger- 
ated  notoriety in the  North  American press, in  a  highly  ideologi- 
cal context. The Wall Street Journal reported  that Eskimos were 
applying their social transfer credits to the  purchase of esoteric 
goods such as phonographs  and  alarm  clocks.  Despite  rebuttals 
from Ottawa, this image of the self-sufficient  nomad  losing his 
will for independent living was  presented as a  symptom of the 
demoralizing effect of the welfare state. Marsh lent his  voice to 
this  viewpoint.  Despite  such concerns by  individual  members, 
there is no evidence that the committee ever questioned the 
social transfer system as a whole. If this  underlines the essen- 
tially reactive posture  of the committee, it also shows, with the 
lapse of the Cantley proposals, how the committee exerted 
influence. For the time being, the broad issues of merchant 
relations and social transfers were set aside. 
Instead, the Department of Northern Affairs generated a 
flurry of  new  proposals  that  aimed to encourage new economic 
activities for Eskimo people. An Eskimo  Loan  Fund  was  out- 
lined. It was intended to provide Eskimos  with  capital over and 
above the short-term credit represented by the “trader’s stake.” 
Its immediate purpose  was to fund  producer  goods  such as boats, 
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traps and, later, skidoos to augment  the  trapping industry. At the 
same time the loans  could  be  applied to alternative  economic 
initiatives. One of these called for the promotion of small 
settlement-based enterprises in  such  areas as handcrafts, cloth- 
ing and boat building. These could be sustained in single 
communities and could provide a cash income apart from 
trapping. Another  measure  addressed  the  problem of land-based 
Eskimos by proposing  that  select  hunting  and  trapping  groups be 
resettled from marginal lands to more promising but vacant 
territories. Still another plan called for the  redirection of land- 
based Eskimos from  trapping into wage  employment in settle- 
ments. The Eskimo Loan Fund  could  provide  capital  in  support 
of all of these, and its endorsement by the  committee  opened  the 
way for launching many  diversified initiatives. 
One outlet not readily endorsed for Loan  Fund  support  was 
Eskimo cooperatives. This question arose, and  was resolved, in 
a  revealing  way. There were  already  doubts  within  the  senior 
administrative ranks when, in 1954, the  Development  Section 
(NAB)raisedthepossibility ofinvestigating  cooperatives.  Indeed, 
when an Eskimo group at Aklavik  called for help in organizing  a 
local co-op, the response was  anything  but positive. The NAB 
director surmised  that the principle was  poorly  understood and 
was  being forwarded simply as a  means to reduce retail prices. 
Whether the question of cooperatives was  ever  put  directly  to 
the committee is unclear. However, committee thinking was 
cited  by the administration in its efforts to downplay  the  Aklavik 
request. Interpreting the latter as a call for “the government 
[to] enter the trading field,” the director replied that this 
question  had  been  resolved at the  policy level (PAC  22/298b). 
Senior branch officials harboured  reservations  about  coopera- 
tive development on ideological grounds, viewing them as 
socialist experiments incompatible with the Ottawa govern- 
ment’soutlook(B.G. Sivertz,pers. comm. 1983). The “project” 
approach to local enterprise, which  the  branch  had  devised  and 
the committee had vetted, offered an alternative frame of 
reference by  which the cooperative option  could  be deflected. 
Not  until 1959 were cooperatives seriously  considered again, at 
a time when social mobilization  was  accorded  more  importance. 
At  this later point the Hudson’s  Bay  Company led the  opposi- 
tion, mounting a sustained campaign to limit the spread of 
Eskimo cooperatives, which it feared as a  potential  source of 
commercial competition (Clancy, 1985). 
A  third issue arose out of  the  administrative  implications  of 
the  new arctic development  program  and  particularly  the new 
field presence it presumed. The 1952  conference  had  resisted  the 
creation of any new arctic field service (which may have 
conjured up images  of  a  new Indian Affairs  bureaucracy).  While 
the new initiatives needed special logistical support, continued 
opposition within the committee  caused the field  staff  question 
to be deferred for several years. Arctic  Section  personnel  were 
assigned to the pilot projects, but  the  RCMP  continued to serve 
as the general government field service for the  time being. 
Developments during the winter  and  spring of 1954 served to 
recast this question. The spectre of social hardship  brought  a 
sense of urgency, which  dissolved the resistance. There was a 
rash of reports of food shortages, local destitution and even 
starvation among Eskimos at isolated posts. In  several cases 
emergency airlifts were  organized to deliver relief rations. In 
other cases, confusion arose subsequently over the  degree of 
actual privation that  had occurred. Either way, the administra- 
tion’s surveillance and reporting capacities were questioned. 
Moreover,  the  publicity  attached to these reports brought censorious 
CANADIAN ESKIMO AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
editorial comment in the southern  press as well as criticism from 
the  parliamentary opposition. Apart from the  charges of social 
neglect, the deficiencies of the patchwork field  network  were 
evident. The administration’s response was to attach greater 
urgency to the alternative economic  programs  and to upgrade 
their staffing. At its fourth meeting in  May 1954, the  committee 
was  briefed on the establishment of a new headquarters unit, the 
Arctic Division, which would handle all Eskimo programs 
except education and game. For the field, the new position of 
northern service officer (NSO) was announced, along  with  six 
initial postings. The Northern  Administration  sought to reassure 
committee members  that 
It is not intended that these  men [NSOs] will take over the 
functionspresentlybeingperformedbyR.C.M.P.orothersinthe 
field, but rather that they will endeavour to co-ordinate the 
activities of all field organizations with a view to making the 
greatest  possible use of all resources  available  and  to  improving 
the economy  and  living  conditions  among the Eskimos in the 
areas to which they are  assigned. [PAC 221298a.l 
Under the circumstances, the  committee  could offer little by 
way  of  principled objection. On the economic issues, “it was 
generally agreed  that  satisfactory  progress was being  made in 
this direction and  that  the  program  being  followed was meeting 
the immediate need  and  could be expanded  gradually as needs 
ariseandrequiredinformationbecomesavailable”(PAC2U298a). 
The pace of administrative change continued to quicken in 
March 1955, when the Northern  Affairs minister, Jean Lesage, 
announced the results  of the educational policy deliberations. 
The new policy involved “an extensive program of construction 
of schools and hostels to provide better education for children  in 
the N.W.T.” (PAC 22/298d). The educational issue was one of 
the  most complicated of those faced by Ottawa  in  the 1950s, in 
large part because of the entrenched  church  interests  and  the 
need to break with longstanding arrangements. Here  develop- 
ments  in the Arctic  were  tied to negotiations in the Mackenzie 
District, and Lesage’s announcement  marked the culmination of 
a decade of manoeuvring. The government  established  a  single 
integrated system of day and residential schools across the 
N.W.T. (Carney, 1971).  Over  a six-year period, Ottawa  pro- 
posed to build, fund  and operate the schools, while also funding 
residential hostels that  would be run  by  the  churches.  In  the 
arctic region, this  represented  practically  an entire new program, 
with the schools actively contributing to the migration of 
Eskimos to settlements. 
The middle years  saw  a shift in  focus  in  committee  delibera- 
tions. The program outlined after 1952 embraced  a  multiplicity 
of small projects, whose general impact depended on their 
cumulative success and steady extension. For instance, several 
small groups of a  dozen families or fewer had  been  relocated to 
new hunting and trapping territories by 1954 at Resolution, 
Craig Harbour, Banks Island and other locations. Similarly, on 
the  wage employment front, groups of Eskimo  men  were  sent to 
Churchill  and Frobisher Bay to learn  maintenance skills, while 
others were  placed at mines in the Ungava and at Rankin Inlet. 
The local manufacturing projects were  similarly  diverse:  boat 
building  and repair at Lake Harbour  and Tuktoyaktuk, art at 
Cape  Dorset  and small stores at Craig  and  Herschel Island. 
While this thrust continued, and  accelerated after 1959, the 
situation at mid-decade  opened  a  new set of  possibilities. The 
advent of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line defence 
installations, along with the nickel mine being developed at 
Rankin Inlet, held out the prospect of  absorbing not handfuls  but 
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hundreds of Eskimo workers. While  not  unconcerned  about  the 
social impact  of  such developments, the  Department of North- 
ern Affairs also recognized the economic possibilities they 
brought  and their obvious fit with  a  second  economic  strategy 
(Lesage, 1955). The Canada-U.S. treaty on the DEW line 
included rules governing the  use of local  labour.  Furthermore, 
one of the most important early assignments for the NSOs, other 
than organizing training projects, was in  DEW line liaison.  Not 
only  were  they to screen applicants for employment, but  the 
NSOs  were also instructed to monitor wage  and  work conditions 
($1.25 per hour for unskilled jobs; parity  with  white  workers on
skilled jobs) (PAC 22/298e). The committee had considered  the 
prospect of setting a  uniform  wage rate for all  Eskimo labour. 
This would either have  forced  the older northern  agencies  up to 
DEW line standards or allowed  the defence contractors to pay 
their Eskimo employees a lower wage, reflecting  the  northern 
average. In the end, the committee  concluded  that  the  uniform 
wage  was  not practicable. 
At its peak, the DEW line employed 250 Eskimos. This 
period  was  brief  but intense. With  construction all but complete 
by late 1957, about 100 Eskimos  retained  permanent  positions. 
The timely opening of the North  Rankin  Nickel  Mine  in  1957 
served to sustain the drive for training  and  wage  employment. 
During its operating years (1958-63), the  mine  employed  about 
80 Eskimo  workers on average (Williamson, 1974). To bridge 
the skills gap, training of various types was now offered at 
Frobisher Bay  and Churchill, as well as at the Leduc  Vocational 
Training Centre in Alberta. These matters  increasingly  occupied 
the committee’s agenda in the late 1950s. 
Given such wide-ranging state initiatives, the  function  of  the 
Eskimo Affairs Committee began to change. Increasingly it was 
presented with detailed reports about  projects  whose  underlying 
rationale lay beyond debate. Social and economic pressures 
originating in the North  had forced Ottawa to act  according to a 
timetable and on a scale not unanimously supported at the 
committee level. For example, RCMP  Commissioner  Nicholson 
had  grown  increasingly apprehensive about the plans for social 
change. He outlined these concerns publicly  in  an article in The 
Beaver (Nicholson, 1959). Nicholson also urged  caution on his 
committee colleagues, though senior northern officials saw  this 
as an effort “to insulate the Eskimos to a  degree  that  we  think  is 
not realistic or in the long run  advantageous”  (PAC 22/298f). 
Not all of the northern officials were  comfortable with the fast 
pace of action. In a 1955 memorandum, James Cantley, the 
secretary to the EAC, questioned the efficacy and even the 
legitimacy of the expanded state role: “Once the  break  from  the 
traditional ways has been made, there can be no turning  back. 
. . . How will [the Eskimos] regard all these plans we are 
making on their behalf?”  Turning  specifically to the role of the 
EAC, he noted the difficulties facing a functionally defined 
administration in reaching even  internal  agreement on policy. 
To Cantley , the EAC had  not fulfilled its mandate as a  coordina- 
tor. On the contrary, “each faction sees to its own interests” 
(PAC 2Y298c). 
Not surprisingly, the committee played  a  diminished  role in 
the latter half of its life. After May 1955, meetings  were  trimmed 
to once yearly, in the spring. The motors of social  change had 
shifted from the old institutional orders to new ones.  Corporate 
capital  and public finance began to overshadow  the  merchant 
traders and missions, forcing the latter increasingly  into  rear- 
guard skirmishes to protect their continuing  prerogatives. New 
consultative structures, such as the triennial Northern  Resource 
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Conferences inaugurated  by  the  Department of Northern  Affairs 
in 1957, offered channels for industrial  resource f m s  to advise 
on policy. Even in the field, the outline of  new local  authorities 
could  be discerned. By 1959 there  were  more  than 20 northern 
service officers spread through  communities  in  the  Arctic.  A 
sign of the administrative evolution of the  field force was the 
elimination of the NSO position  (with its developmental  over- 
tones) and the designation of those personnel as “settlement 
managers. ’ ’ 
THE  COMMITTEE IN RETROSPECT 
Over the years, the  committee  had  a  hand i  many  significant 
public policy questions. Yet to assess its unique impact as a 
decision-making  body  is  more difficult. Strictly speaking, the 
minister  was  not  bound by committee decisions, nor  was  he  even 
obliged to take its views into account. Yet  clearly  there  were 
advantages  in  according  the  committee  some  role  as  a  consulta- 
tive body. The Department of Northern  Affairs  was  assuming 
the Eskimo mandate at a  time  of  considerable social flux  and 
possessed  very little experience to guide it. Not  only  did  the 
committee embrace the  widest  range of arctic  field agencies, it 
also contributed in  a defacto, if  not de jure, manner to remedy- 
ing  the N.W.T. Council’s obvious limits in handling  matters 
north of the tree line. The committee emerged, at the  initiative of 
the northern administration, in the  absence of indigenous  repre- 
sentative channels. Yet its role was  clearly calculated. It  was 
never  intended to be  broadly representative, but  rather  to  enlist 
the advice of  selected interests that  had  preceded  the  northern 
administration into the field. 
It was constituted neither as an external  advisory  committee 
nor as an internal administrative working  group. Instead, it  was 
rather cautiously composed of a civil service  majority and a 
non-governmental  minority. The committee  itself  became  a site 
for exchanging, adjusting and  accommodating  the  concerns of 
its diverse constituents. The non-governmental organizations 
represented on the committee sometimes  succeeded  and  some- 
times failed in their efforts to shape  policy outputs. On some 
issues the victory  was temporary, as in delaying the creation of 
an arctic field service or the  extension  of  Eskimo cooperatives. 
On other matters the impact  was  more p rmanent, as in  rejecting 
the crown trading company. The negative or blocking  character 
of many such efforts is quite revealing. Whether due to its 
diverse make-up or its essentially reactive posture, the commit- 
tee was better able to register its opposition to specific  initiatives 
than to formulate and  promote  positive  programs. 
It should  not be assumed  that  the  broad  transition  from  the 
“old” agencies to the “new” necessarily  reflected  a zero sum 
conflict in  which the old triumvirate was  implacably  opposed to
change. In many respects, the resources of the  missions, the 
police  and the HBC  were  stretched  desperately  thin  in the 1950s. 
They  may have been unable to  absorb  any new responsibilities 
unless the expense was  underwritten  heavily by the  state. So 
long as they  seemed congruent with  past practice, many  ele- 
ments  of  Ottawa’s  developmnt  program  were quite welcome. 
For the Hudson’s Bay Company, the new social transfers 
dramatically augmented native purchasing power. The only 
danger lay in the advent of retail cooperative competition, 
cutting into the  flow  of  commerce. The police too were often 
ambivalent  about  their  general  administrative  duties  and  expressed 
willingness to get back to their classical function. As  the 1950s 
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ended, these political struggles intensified, but  found  channels 
outside the EAC process. 
By the early 1960s the broader political agenda  had  reached  a 
turning point that  bore directly on the future of the  committee. 
The time was approaching when the council would have to 
expand its membership to embrace the entire Northwest  Territo- 
ries. In 1960 Ottawa bought  some  time  by  deciding  to  fill  the 
appointed  positions  on council not  with  federal officials but  with 
private citizens with northern experience. Alternatively, the 
possibility  of dividing the N. W.T. into separate Mackenzie and 
arctic jurisdictions was first suggested in 1961. This would 
permit the Mackenzie District to advance  toward  responsible 
government  and  economic  maturity (in accord  with its greater 
momentum), while the Arctic  could  be  more  slowly  and  inten- 
sively tutored by Ottawa (Bovey, 1966). 
The annals  of the Eskimo Affairs  Committee illustrate how 
the logic of separate political development  for  the  Arctic  took 
hold during the 1950s. Politically and administratively, the 
differences between the Arctic and Mackenzie districts were 
much  more compelling than their similarities. Thus a  separate 
policy structure was required. While it differed in delegate 
composition, the committee nonetheless  reflected  the  essential 
structure of the evolving N.W.T. Council. Both had been 
designed to bring together the  key  institutional orders with  a 
stake  in  northern  public  policy. Just as the  council  began  with  a 
purely institutional membership, and later experimented  with 
public representation by appointing  persons  with  special  knowl- 
edge of the North, so did  the  EAC  during  the 1950s. The three 
Eskimo appointees of 1959 can be viewed as an effort to prolong 
this  phase. However, the modernization of the  arctic  administra- 
tion, together with the appearance of rival  consultative channels, 
rendered  the Eskimo Affairs  Committee  increasingly  marginal. 
In 1962 it ceased to operate. 
The flow  of influence between interest groups  and  states  has 
recently  been the subject of extensive theorization. Centring on 
the  phenomenon of corporatism, elements of this literature may 
help explain the  roots  of the particular form of decision  making 
traced here. Phillippe Schmitter proposes  a  distinction  between 
“societal” and “state” forms. While  this  turns  on  a  number  of 
properties, it draws particular attention to the genealogy of 
organized interests. In the “societal’ ’ form, the  groups exist prior 
to and independent of their inclusion in corporatist structures. 
Through their participation, the  autonomous  functioning  units 
bestow legitimacy on the decisions  taken  in  the  name of the 
state, while gaining in return privileged  access to the  decision 
process. This is not so for the “state” variant, in which the 
organized interests essentially originate under state sponsorship 
in order to serve in the corporatist structure (Schmitter, 1974). 
To the extent that the EAC  shares corporatist traits, it reflects  the 
societal type. 
K. J. Rea has suggested also that the post-war  political  system 
in the  North  has  been ssentially “corporatist” in character. For 
Rea, 
the structure of the  decision  system  under  corporatism  is  distin- 
guished by the existence of formally recognized bodies with 
different  interests. . . . What is  distinctive  about  theprocesses of 
corporative decision-making is that they involve bargaining 
among  participants  over  preconceived  policy  alternatives.  [Rea, 
1976:152.] 
The activities of  the Eskimo Affairs  Committee  suggest  that 
an lement of corporatism prevailed  in  the  Arctic  of  the 1950s. 
The question of how long it persisted, or whether  the  societal 
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form yielded to a more state-centred corporatism, cannot be 
addressed here. Indeed, care must  be  taken to avoid  painting 
such a portrait too broadly. Certainly the EAC machinery 
conferred reciprocal benefits on most  participants.  However, it 
far from exhausted the political  needs of its  members.  More- 
over, the committee’s procedural  practices  were  firmly  tilted to 
the advantage of the  northern  administration itself. At  most  the 
committee offered its members an opportunity to influence, 
rather than a delegation of power. At the same time, the 
committee helped to ease a majorpolitical as well as administra- 
tive transition. In this, it helps  explain why a  greater  protest  did 
not surface from organized northern interests during such a 
turbulent  time.  In  many  ways the life of the committee  reflects 
its  times  in sharp focus. 
REFERENCES 
BOVEY, J. 1966. The  growth of N.W.T. government.  North  (July-August): 
40-43. 
CANTLEY, J. 1950. Survey of economic  conditions  among  the  Eskimos of the 
Canadian  Arctic.  Ottawa:  Department of Resources and Development. 
CARNEY, R.J. 1971. Relations  in  education  between  the  federal and territorial 
governments and the Roman Catholic church in the Mackenzie District, 
N.W.T.  1867-1961.  Ph.D. thesis,UniversityofAlberta,Edmonton,Alberta, 
Canada. 
CLANCY, J.P. 1985. Caribou,furandtheresourcefrontier:Apoliticaleconomy 
0ftheN.W.T. to  1967. Ph.D. thesis, Queen’sUniversity,  Kingston, Ontario, 
Canada. 
DOSMAN,E.J. 1975.TheNationalInterest.Toronto:McClellandandStewart. 
FLANAGAN, R.T. 1958. A  history of the  department of northern  affairs  and 
national  resources  in its various  manifestations  since 1867. Ottawa:  Depart- 
ment  of Northern  Affairs  and  National  Resources. 
FUMOLEAU, R. 1975. As  Long as This  Land  Shall Last. Toronto:  McClelland 
GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  NORTHWEST  TERRITORIES.  1978.  Decade of 
and Stewart. 
Progress. Yellowknife. 
JENNESS, D. 1964.  Eskimo  Administration:  Canada.  Montreal:  Arctic  Institute 
of North  America. 
LESAGE, J. 1955.  Enter  the  European: V.  Among  the  Eskimos.  Part 2. The 
Beaver, Outfit  285  (Spring):3-9. 
MORRISON,  W.R.  1985.  Showing  the Flag. Vancouver:  University of British 
Columbia  Press. 
NICHOLSON,  L.H.  1959.  The  problem  of  the  people.  The  Beaver,  Outfit  289 
(Spring):20-24. 
PAC 22253a. Press Release.  Department  of  Resources and Development. 22 
May  1952.  RG22, Vol. 253, File 40-8-l(2). Note:  All  PAC citations are from 
the  Public  Archives  of  Canada,  Federal  Archives  Division. 
PAC 22253b. Eskimo  Affairs  Conference.  Summary of Conference  Proceed- 
ings.  19-20  May  1952.  RG22, Vol. 253,  File 40-8-l(2). 
PAC 22253~ .  J. Wright to Gibson. 23 May 1950. RG22, Vol. 253, File 
PAC 22253d. Minutes.  Eskimo Affairs Committee.  2nd  meeting.  6  May  1953. 
PAC  22/254.  Minutes.  AdvisoIy  Committee on Northern  Development.  11th 
PAC 22298a. Minutes.  Eskimo  Affairs  Committee. 4thmeeting. lOMay  1954. 
PAC 22298b. Cunningham  to  Robertson. 10 January  1955.  RG22,  Vol.  298, 
PAC 22298~.  Cantley to Robertson. 13 January  1955.  RG22,  Vol.  298,  File 
PAC 22/298d. Press Release. Department of Northern Affairs and National 
PAC  2U298e.  Instructions for NSOs.  Paper for 6th  meeting,  Eskimo  Affairs 
PAC  2U298f.  Robertson  to Sivertz. 22  December  1958.  RG22,  Vol.  298,  File 
PAC  2U335a.  Stevenson  to  Robertson. 21 April 1959. RG22,  Vol. 335, File 
PAC 23335b. Minutes. Eskimo Affairs Committee. loth meeting. 25 May 
1959. RG22, Vol. 335,  File  40-8-19. 
REA, K.J. 1976. The Political  Economy of  Northern Development.  Ottawa: 
Information  Canada. 
SCHMI’ITER,  P.C. 1974. Still the  century  of  corporatism? In: Pike, F.B., and 
Stritch, T., eds. The  New Corporatism.  Notre  Dame:  University of  Notre 
Dame  Press.  85-131. 
40-8-l(2). 
RG 22,  Vol. 253, File 40-8-l(3). 
meeting. 14 September  1953.  RG22,  Vol. 254, File 40-8-l(4). 
RG22,  Vol. 298, File 40-8-l(5). 
File 40-8-l(5). 
40-8-l(5). 
Resources. 28 March 1955. RG22, Vol. 298,  File 40-8-l(6). 
Committee. 30 May  1955.  RG22,  Vol. 298, File 40-8-l(6). 
40-8-l(10). 
40-8-19. 
TIME.  1953.  The  Provinces. 19 January  1953:32. 
USHER,P.J.,andBEAKHUST,G. 1973.LandUseRegulationintheCanadian 
WALL  STREET  JOURNAL. 1952. 2  December  1952:13. 
North.  Ottawa:  Canadian  Arctic  Resources  Committee. 
WILLIAMSON,  R.G. 1974. Eskimo  Underground.  Uppsala:  Uppsala  Univer- 
WOODLEY, C.W. 1965. Administration for development. M.A. thesis, 
ZASLOW,  M.  1975.  Reading  the  Rocks.  Toronto:  Macmillan. 
sity. 
Queen’s  University,  Kingston, Ontario, Canada. 
